El propósito de este artículo es estudiar la actualidad del binomio persona-naturaleza para fundamentar la unión hipostática de acuerdo con el pensamiento de Tomás de Aquino. Ambos conceptos se necesitan mutuamente no sólo como la parte y el todo para fundar una Metafísica de la Encarnación, sino también para poder predicar las naturalezas del único supuesto de modo de no destruir la unidad personal de Cristo. De este modo, para el Aquinate, persona y naturaleza no sólo expresan nociones metafísicas, sino (...) también conceptos que se predican del único supuesto subsistente. (shrink)

El carácter analítico de Meditationes implica que, por una parte, ninguna verdad puede ser interpretada sin referencia al lugar concreto que ocupa en el orden de razones y, por otra, que no existen en Meditationes ficciones que permanezcan advertidamente como tales. Sin embargo, la presencia de algunas pasiones no ha sido justificada, lo que pone en cuestión el carácter analítico de la obra. Proponemos que tales pasiones son efecto de juicios implícitos. Para poner a prueba nuestra hipótesis, hemos elegido un (...) enigmático párrafo que hemos denominado el “texto de la adoración.”. (shrink)

Una aportación importante de Tocqueville a la sociología de la familia es haber mostrado la ligazón existente entre la estructura familiar y la organización social, así como su análisis de las dinámicas psico-políticas del emergente ideal de familia democrática. Sin embargo, el humanismo cívico de Tocqueville se estrella ante la “cuestión de la mujer”. Su defensa de la división sexual del trabajo como funcional para el sistema social o, en su terminología, para el orden moral, fuente y principio del orden (...) social, aprisiona a las mujeres entre los muros de sus hogares y les priva la posibilidad de convertirse en seres completos, es decir, les niega la ciudadanía. Así, el republicanismo tocquevilleano hay que leerlo en masculino: el poder está en manos de los varones y las mujeres son la total otredad, permanecen en la sombra de la democracia, junto a los “no blancos” y los pobres. (shrink)

Alexis karpouzos is a visioner in the development of post-history sense of cosmic unity and the integral consciousness. For him, spirituality is not just about personal enlightenment but is deeply connected to moral action. He view ethical living as a natural outgrowth of spiritual awareness. In his worldview, the divine is not something distant or abstract but is present in every human being, and this awareness should lead to moral behavior that reflects love, justice, and equality. In many of (...) his writings, Alexis karpouzos calls for the realization of a moral society, one that is based on mutual respect, compassion, and the recognition of the divine essence in all people. His commitment to social reform, education, and the improvement of human welfare can be seen as an extension of his spiritual values, grounded in the belief that the divine resides within every person, regardless of their social or economic status. Alexis karpouzos believe that the process of spiritual growth was a deeply personal journey. He often spoke of the importance of inner freedom and self-realization. For him, true liberation was not something that could be granted from outside, but a state of consciousness that could only be attained through deep self-awareness and connection to the universe. This self-realization, however, did not mean renouncing the social and historical world; rather, it involved seeing the universal consciousness in all aspects of life and acting in alignment with it. (shrink)

Philosophical and sociological approaches in technology have increasingly shifted toward describing AI (artificial intelligence) systems as ‘(moral) agents,’ while also attributing ‘agency’ to them. It is only in this way – so their principal argument goes – that the effects of technological components in a complex human-computer interaction can be understood sufficiently in phenomenological-descriptive and ethical-normative respects. By contrast, this article aims to demonstrate that an explanatory model only achieves a descriptively and normatively satisfactory result if the concepts of ‘(moral) (...) agent’ and ‘(moral) agency’ are exclusively related to human agents. Initially, the division between symbolic and sub-symbolic AI, the black box character of (deep) machine learning, and the complex relationship network in the provision and application of machine learning are outlined. Next, the ontological and action-theoretical basic assumptions of an ‘agency’ attribution regarding both the current teleology-naturalism debate and the explanatory model of actor network theory are examined. On this basis, the technical-philosophical approaches of Luciano Floridi, Deborah G. Johnson, and Peter-Paul Verbeek will all be critically discussed. Despite their different approaches, they tend to fully integrate computational behavior into their concept of ‘(moral) agency.’ By contrast, this essay recommends distinguishing conceptually between the different entities, causalities, and relationships in a human-computer interaction, arguing that this is the only way to do justice to both human responsibility and the moral significance and causality of computational behavior. (shrink)

En el debate entre el positivismo y el no-positivismo el argumento del relativismo tiene un papel fundamental. Tal y como es presentado, por ejemplo, por Hans Kelsen, este argumento señala, en primer lugar, que una conexión necesaria entre el derecho y la moral presupone la existencia de elementos morales objetivos, absolutos y necesarios, y, en segundo lugar, que estos elementos morales objetivos, absolutos y necesarios no existen. Mi respuesta a esto es que los elementos morales absolutos, objetivos (...) y necesarios existen, porque los derechos humanos existen, y éstos existen porque son fundamentables. In the debate between positivism and non-positivism the argument from relativism plays a pivotal role. The argument from relativism, as put forward, for instance, by Hans Kelsen, says, first, that a necessary connection between law and morality presupposes the existence of absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements, and, second, that no such absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements exist. My reply to this is that absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements do exist, for human rights exist, and human rights exist because they are justifiable. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century, made significant contributions to the philosophy of language. His work is often divided into two periods: early and later Wittgenstein. The concept of the logic of language is central to both, though his understanding of it evolved significantly over time. Wittgenstein's exploration of the logic of language fundamentally reshaped our understanding of how language relates to the world. His early work provided a foundation for logical positivism and analytic (...) philosophy, while his later work opened new avenues for understanding the complexities of human communication. Together, these contributions offer a rich and nuanced perspective on the nature of language, meaning, and human interaction. In his early work, the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," Wittgenstein aimed to establish a clear relationship between language and reality. He believed that language mirrors the world through logical structures, which he referred to as "logical form." According to early Wittgenstein, the world consists of facts, not things, and language's primary function is to represent these facts. Wittgenstein’s "Philosophical Investigations" presents a radical shift from his earlier work and offers a deep and nuanced understanding of language and its role in human life. By focusing on the practical uses of language and the various contexts in which it operates, Wittgenstein dissolves many traditional philosophical problems and opens up new ways of thinking about meaning, communication, and the nature of reality. His work remains a cornerstone of contemporary philosophy and continues to inspire debate and exploration. (shrink)

In the debate between positivism and non-positivism the argument from relativism plays a pivotal role. The argument from relativism, as put forward, for instance, by Hans Kelsen, says, first, that a necessary connection between law and morality presupposes the existence of absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements, and, second, that no such absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements exist. My reply to this is that absolute, objective, or necessary moral elements do exist, for human rights exist, and human rights exist (...) because they are justifiable. (shrink)

The author's thesis is that there is a conceptually necessary connection between law and morality which means legal positivism must fail as a comprehensive theory. The substantiation of this thesis takes place within a conceptual framework which shows that there are at least 64 theses to be distinguished, concerning the relationship of law and morality. The basis for the author's argument in favour of a necessary connection, is formed by the thesis that individual legal norms and decisions as well as (...) whole legal systems necessarily make a claim to correctness. The explication of this claim within the frame of discourse theory shows that the law has a conceptually necessary, ideal dimension, which connects law with a procedural, universalistic morality. (shrink)

Erscheint anlasslich des 15. Weltkongresses der Internationalen Vereinigung fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) vom 18. bis 24. August 1991 in Gottingen und enthalt eine Selbstdarstellung der deutschen Sektion der IVR. Die Autoren berichten uber ihre eigene theoretische Position oder uber neuere Diskussionszusammenhange, die ihnen wichtig erscheinen. Aus dem Inhalt: K. Adomeit: Menschenrechte und Rechtsphilosophie u H. Albert: Erkenntnis, Recht und soziale Ordnung u R. Alexy: Idee und Struktur eines vernunftigen Rechtssystems u O. Ballweg: Analytische Rhetorik als juristische Grundlagenforschung u R. (...) Dreier: Zur gegenwartigen Diskussion des Verhaltnisses von Recht und Moral u W. Eichhorn: Wege und Irrwege einer Transformation u M. Frommel: Mannliche Gerechtigkeitsmathematik versus weiblicher Kontextualismus? u H. Garrn: Zur rechtspraktischen Bedeutung einer Theorie der juristischen Rhetorik u G. Haney: Das Widerspruchsvolle des Rechtsbegriffs u W. Hassemer: Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtswissenschaft, Rechtspolitik - am Beispiel des Strafrechts u A. Kaufmann: 45 Jahre erlebte Jahre Rechtsphilosophie u H. Klenner: Die ontologische und gnoseologische Dimension der Sein/Sollen-Problematik u U. Klug: Multidimensionale Rechtsphilosophie u H.-J. Koch/H. Russmann: Juristische Methodenlehre und analytische Philosophie u M. Kriele: Die demokratische Weltrevolution u K. Kuhl: Rehabilitierung und Aktualisierung des kantischen Vernunftrechts u E.-J. Lampe: Moderne Rechtsanthropologie u K.A. Mollnau: Vom Beginn der Niedergangsjurisprudenz in der DDR u U. Neumann: Sprachphilosophische Ansatze in der neueren Rechtsphilosophie u u.a. (Franz Steiner 1991). (shrink)

The present paper analyses the topic of scientific discovery and the problem of the existence of a logical framework involved in such endeavour. We inquire how several non-monotonic logic frameworks and other formalisms can account for such a task. In the same vein, we analyse some key aspects of the historical and theoretical debate surrounding scientific discovery, in particular, the context of discovery and context of justification context distinction. We present an argument concerning the weakening of the discovery/justification context dichotomy (...) based on the descriptive accent contained in the non-monotonic logic perspective together with its epistemological concerns. (shrink)

Various emerging technologies, from social robotics to social media, appeal to our desire for social interactions, while avoiding some of the risks and costs of face-to-face human interaction. But can they offer us real friendship? In this book, Alexis Elder outlines a theory of friendship drawing on Aristotle and contemporary work on social ontology, and then uses it to evaluate the real value of social robotics and emerging social technologies. In the first part of the book Elder develops a (...) robust and rigorous ontology of friendship: what it is, how it functions, what harms it, and how it relates to familiar ethical and philosophical questions about character, value, and well-being. In Part II she applies this ontology to emerging trends in social robotics and human-robot interaction, including robotic companions for lonely seniors, therapeutic robots used to teach social skills to children on the autism spectrum, and companionate robots currently being developed for consumer markets. Elder articulates the moral hazards presented by these robots, while at the same time acknowledging their real and measurable benefits. In the final section she shifts her focus to connections between real people, especially those enabled by social media. Arguing against critics who have charged that these new communication technologies are weakening our social connections, Elder explores ways in which text messaging, video chats, Facebook, and Snapchat are enabling us to develop, sustain, and enrich our friendship in new and meaningful ways. (shrink)

When it comes to social robotics (robots that engage human social responses via “eyes” and other facial features, voice-based natural-language interactions, and even evocative movements), ethicists, particularly in European and North American traditions, are divided over whether and why they might be morally considerable. Some argue that moral considerability is based on internal psychological states like consciousness and sentience, and debate about thresholds of such features sufficient for ethical consideration, a move sometimes criticized for being overly dualistic in its framing (...) of mind versus body. Others, meanwhile, focus on the effects of these robots on human beings, arguing that psychological impact alone can qualify an entity for moral status. What both sides overlook is the importance for ordinary moral reasoning of integrating questions about an entity’s “inner life,” and its psychological effect on us. Turning to accounts of relationships in virtue ethics, especially those of the Confucian tradition, we find a more nuanced theory that can provide complex guidance on the moral considerability of social robots, including ethical considerations about whether and how to question this to begin with. (shrink)

Este artículo muestra que la Biología del conocimiento de Humberto Maturana pretendió ser una Fenomenología del conocer pero devino gnoseología escéptica. El problema se originó cuando el autor no partió desde la descripción de las experiencias que justificarían la nueva "conciencia epistemológica" que buscaba, es decir, la conciencia de que la realidad debiera ponerse entre paréntesis. En vez de eso, prefirió adherir arbitrariamente a axiomas escépticos, porque su propósito principal era la refutación de la teoría de la objetividad.

If the specificity of liberal democracy, as a regime, is to base power on consent then political violence appears to contradict the typical self-understanding of the societies whose functioning it informs. A justification of the motives which may call for such violence thus becomes both a political and a philosophical problem when such a regime faces the necessity to resort to violent means of action. Reaching intellectual maturity during the 30’s and the 40’s, while democratic states were faltering in Europe, (...) Raymond Aron had an acute understanding of this issue. An inquiry into Aron’s publications from that period will help us identify what kind of moral and cultural foundations they need to have if they are not to collapse during wartime. These texts also shed an original light on his post-war political thought and may lead us to reconsider some dominant contemporary interpretations of his work as revolving around the Kantian–Machiavellian antinomy. When compared to either element of this antinomy, Aron’s conception of agency, its emphasis on moral obligations, virtues and moral character, starts bearing more resemblance to the political science of Aristotle than to modern social or political science. (shrink)

In this article the author adduces a non‐positivist argument for a necessary connection between law and morality; the argument is based on the claim to correctness, and it is directed to an attack stemming from Eugenio Bulygin. The heart of the controversy is the claim to correctness. The author first attempts to show that there are good reasons for maintaining that law necessarily raises a claim to correctness. He argues, second, for the thesis that this claim has moral implications. Finally, (...) he attempts to refute Bulygin's objection that the claim‐based argument for non‐positivism boils down to contradiction and triviality. (shrink)

Digital records, from chat transcripts to social media posts, are being used to create chatbots that recreate the conversational style of deceased individuals. Some maintain that this is merely a new form of digital memorial, while others argue that they pose a variety of moral hazards. To resolve this, I turn to classical Chinese philosophy to make use of a debate over the ethics of funerals and mourning. This ancient argument includes much of interest for the contemporary issue at hand, (...) including the use of impersonators of the dead to help the bereaved to deal well with their grief. I connect this historical discussion with a modern trend in clinical psychology that reframes therapeutic interventions with bereaved individuals. The trend directs practitioners away from facilitating detachment and toward affirming continuing bonds. I conclude that these chatbots can offer an important source of support to mourners, but also discuss parameters and features of social context that will be important to avoid the moral hazards identified by sceptics. (shrink)

In his book Legality Scott J Shapiro presents a large-scale and sophisticated attempt to defend legal positivism in its most outspoken form, namely exclusive legal positivism. This, however, does not mean that morality plays no role in Shapiro’s analysis of the nature of law. On the contrary, he connects law with morality in myriad ways. This gives rise to the question of whether Shapiro’s theory of the nature of law is truly positivistic. In the article I argue that Shapiro’s theory (...) is, first, in crucial respects non-positivistic, and, second, in certain other respects indeed positivistic but in need of being converted into a non-positivistic theory. (shrink)

" Dans ce livre on a eu le souci d'explorer la démarche expérimentale de Bergson. L'ordre suivi a été celui de ses grandes œuvres, l'Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Matière et mémoire, L'Evolution créatrice, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion. L'étude s'est développée suivant la logique bergsonienne comprise comme logique des significations, dont on peut dire métaphoriquement qu'elle respecte l'ordre de la stratégie militaire par exemple dans la position des problèmes, dans l'exploitation des (...) résultats, etc. Par là même s'est effrité pour enfin disparaître le thème du "bergsonisme" comme philosophie musicale et sentimentale. Ce qui frappera le lecteur, c'est l'énergie déployée par Bergson et sa rigueur dans l'examen des faits, comme l'aphasie ou encore la conscience de la liberté. A travers les thèmes bergsoniens on a été surpris de relever - outre les déclarations faites en clair - une opposition décidée et décisive par rapport à Kant, dont Bergson connaissait l'œuvre, d'après cette étude, avec une haute précision. Certaines thèses de Bergson ne se comprennent même que par leur opposition au criticisme. Ce livre a été rédigé dans le souci d'écarter toutes les prétendues contradictions de l'auteur de Matière et mémoire. Le présent exposé doit par lui-même faire justice de toutes les interprétations fondées sur des contradictions et au demeurant il reste vrai de dire avec Bergson que le temps passé à dénoncer des contradictions est en philosophie du temps perdu. On fera des rencontres inattendues dans ce livre. Non seulement Kant, mais aussi Tolstoï, qui semble avoir devancé Bergson. Ici se trace une voie d'interprétation : la pensée de Bergson peut être enrichie par des éclairages nouveaux et précis qui en définiront mieux la grande actualité. " Alexis Philonenko. (shrink)

Nous avons etudie la pensee de Kant et de Fichte pendant l'annee 1793. En ce temps-la naissait un monde nouveau. Le 20 septembre 1792 se livre la celebre bataille de Valmy. Valmy, defaite de la monarchie du point de vue de la strategie, etait d'abord une defaite morale, la ruine d'un monde ethique. A Kant, le plus grand philosophe du XVIIIeme siecle, se posa la question: Qu'est-ce que la Revolution? A Fichte, encore inconnu, la meme question se posa. Leurs reponses (...) bien differentes symbolisent et expriment le sens de la transformation du monde qui s'effectua alors. Fichte se separa de Kant dans la pensee politique et ainsi, alors qu'un monde nouveau s'annoncait, une nouvelle philosophie prit naissance. Ainsi, si Fichte n'est pas le plus grand des philosophes modernes, il est le premier d'entre eux. S'attacher a sa pensee ce n'est pas seulement le comprendre; c'est aussi nous comprendre nous-memes. (shrink)

Must the best friends necessarily be good people? On the one hand, as Aristotle puts it, ‘people think that the same people are good and also friends’. But on the other hand, friendship sometimes seems to require that one behave badly. For example, a normally honest person might lie to corroborate a friend's story. What I will call closeness, which I take to include sensitivity to friends' subjective values and concerns as well as an inclination to take their subjective interests (...) as reasons for action, is characteristic of friendship. But this seems to require that good friends should be morally flexible, more so than is compatible with a virtuous character. This would imply tension between ideals of friendship and ideals of character. But there is an important connection between virtue and friendship which arises precisely from friends' closeness, when concern for wellbeing, another important feature of friendship, is also taken into account. This helps mitigate the tension and shows how friendship and virtue are interconnected. The connection in turn provides friendship-based reason to think the best friends must be good people, even though concerns of friendship may occasionally clash with other moral concerns. (shrink)

Two claims lay the foundation for Beyleveld and Brownsword’s legal theory. The first says that immoral laws cannot be law, the second that rights to freedom and welfare can be proven to be logically necessary given merely the phenomenon of agency. The author argues that both claims are too strong. The first is an overidealization of law, which fails to do justice to its double nature as a real as well as an ideal phenomenon. The second must fail, for a (...) moral “ought” cannot be deduced from a merely instrumental “ought.”. (shrink)

At the heart of this book is the age-old question of how law and morality are related. The legal positivist, insisting on the separation of the two, explicates the concept of law independently of morality. The author challenges this view, arguing that there are, first, conceptually necessary connections between law and morality and, second, normative reasons for including moral elements in the concept of law. While the conceptual argument alone is too limited to establish a sufficiently strong connection between law (...) and morality, and the normative argument alone fails to address the nature of law, the two arguments together support a nonpositivistic concept of law, toppling legal positivism qua comprehensive theory of law. (shrink)

The status and functioning of shame is contested in moral psychology. In much of anglophone philosophy and psychology, it is presumed to be largely destructive, while in Confucian philosophy and many East Asian communities, it is positively associated with moral development. Recent work in human-robot interaction offers a unique opportunity to investigate how shame functions while controlling for confounding variables of interpersonal interaction. One research program suggests a Confucian strategy for using robots to rebuke participants, but results from experiments with (...) educational technologies imply a different and potentially opposing account of shame’s role in personal development. By digging deeper into the details of Confucian theorizing about shame, I identify a unifying explanation for these apparently conflicting results. I conclude by offering suggestions for future empirical research in human-robot interactions to further investigate shame’s role in moral development. (shrink)

AbstractWhile the literature on oncofertility decision-making was central to the bioethics debate on social egg freezing when the practice emerged in the late 2000s, there has been little discussion juxtaposing the two forms of egg freezing since. This article offers a new perspective on this debate by comparing empirical qualitative data of two previously conducted studies on medical and social egg freezing. We re-analysed the interview data of the two studies and did a thematic analysis combined with interdisciplinary collaborative auditing (...) for empirical ethics projects. Despite their different contexts, major similarities in women’s decision-making and reasoning were found. We developed two main common themes. Firstly, women felt a clear need to plan for future options. Secondly, they manipulated decision-times by postponing definitive decisions and making micro-decisions. The comparison highlights that the passage of time and the preservation of future choice seems to permeate all aspects of the patient experiences in both studies. As a result of considering real-world lived experiences, we suggest that there are many overlaps in women’s reasoning about egg freezing regardless of why they are making a decision to freeze. These overlaps are morally relevant and thus need to be further integrated into the existing arguments that have been canvassed in the flourishing egg freezing and fertility preservation debates across the field, and in policy and practice globally. (shrink)

The central argument of this article turns on the dual‐nature thesis. This thesis sets out the claim that law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and an ideal or critical dimension. The dual‐nature thesis is incompatible with both exclusive legal positivism and inclusive legal positivism. It is also incompatible with variants of non‐positivism according to which legal validity is lost in all cases of moral defect or demerit (exclusive legal non‐positivism) or, alternatively, is affected in no way at (...) all by moral defects or demerits (super‐inclusive legal non‐positivism). The dual nature of law is expressed, on the one hand, by the Radbruch formula, which says that extreme injustice is not law, and, on the other, by the correctness argument, which says that law's claim to correctness necessarily includes a claim to moral correctness. Thus, what the law is depends not only on social facts, but also on what the law ought to be. (shrink)

The argument of this article is that the dual-nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision-making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation (...) to both authoritative and non-authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law. (shrink)

This paper explicates and defends some of William James' more controversial claims in ‘The Will to Believe’. After showing some of the weaknesses in standard interpretations of James' position, I turn to James' Principles of Psychology and The Varieties of Religious Experience to spell out in more detail James' account of the nature of the attitudes of belief, doubt, and disbelief and link them to an account of the subject. In so doing, the moral force of the argument comes to (...) the fore by casting the question ‘Can we believe at will?’ in a new light. Through a discussion of the conversion experiences of The Varieties of Religious Experience and the kinds of self-transformations in which beliefs that once appeared dead become live that appear throughout James' psychology, the moral urgency of James' position in ‘The Will to Believe’ is clarified. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to survey the moral psychology of emoji, time-restricted messaging and other non-verbal elements of nominally textual computer-mediated communication. These features are increasingly common in interpersonal communication. Effects on both individual well-being and quality of intimate relationships are assessed. Results of this assessment are used to support ethical conclusions about these elements of digital communication. Design/methodology/approach Assessment of these non-verbal elements of CMC is framed in light of relevant literature from a variety of fields, including neuroscience, behavioral (...) economics and social psychology. The resulting ethical analysis is informed by both Aristotelian and Buddhist virtue ethics. Findings This paper finds that emoji and other nonverbal elements of CMC have positive potential for individual well-being and interpersonal communication. They can be used to focus and direct attention, express and acknowledge difficult emotions and increase altruistic tendencies. Research limitations/implications This paper is conceptual, extrapolating from existing literature to investigate possibilities rather than reporting on novel experiments. It is not intended to substitute for empirical research on use patterns and their effects. But by identifying positive potential, it can help both users and designers to support individual and relational well-being. Practical implications The positive effects identified here can be incorporated into both design and use strategies for CMC. Social implications Situating ethical analysis of these trending technologies within literature from the social sciences on the effects of stylized faces, disappearing messages and directed attention can help us both understand their appeal to users and best practices for using them to enrich our social lives. Originality/value The paper uses empirically informed moral psychology to understand a deceptively trivial-looking phenomenon with wide-ranging impacts on human psychology and relationships. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise a challenge to Gideon Rosen’s defence of moral contingentism against Jamie Dreier’s moral luck argument. Dreier argues that if moral contingentism is true, acting in a morally permissible way always depends on a form of moral luck, because we could be in a descriptively identical possible world where the moral laws are different. Rosen’s response is that such a world is too remote from ours for us to count it as lucky that we are not (...) in it. I argue that, given Rosen’s method of assessing the remoteness of possible worlds, worlds like the one Dreier describes are close enough to ours to justify his worry, and consequently that Rosen’s counterargument fails. I take this strongly counterintuitive conclusion as a reason to be optimistic that Rosen’s argument for moral contingentism can be resisted. (shrink)

La poesía colombiana de los sesenta se encuentra en el pleno apogeo artístico: caso Gloria Posada, caso Winston Morales, caso Nelson Romero Guzmán, caso Pablo Montoya. No obstante, Mario Eraso Belalcázar (1967) es un poeta desdeñado por la crítica cultural y especializada. Con este trabajo busco la inserción de la poesía de Eraso en el panorama actual de la poesía colombiana. A través de un ejercicio hermenéutico, analizaré sus cinco libros de poemas que, hasta la fecha, conforman su obra: (...) Cementerio (2005), publicado en Bogotá por Común Presencia Editores y prologado por el reconocido poeta venezolano Armando Rojas Guardia; Oro (2011), editado bajo el cuidado de Ediciones Sin Nombre en México; Extravío seguido de Amanecer en Lisboa con Oliverio (2015) bajo el sello de la Editorial Universidad del Cauca; y, Aviso de la casa (2022), impreso en Bogotá por la editorial Letra a Letra. En suma, se ilustrará cómo los elementos arcanos presentes en su trabajo hacen de su arte un locus singular y autosuficiente. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage retrace le mouvement de la pensée du philosophe anglais Francis Bacon, depuis les essais qu'il compose par petites touches pour construire une philosophie morale, jusqu'à New Atlantis, qui est à la fois utopie, programme scientifique, et mise en oeuvre des grands principes de sa philosophie naturelle.

Caregiving robots are often lauded for their potential to assist with geriatric care. While seniors can be wise and mature, possessing valuable life experience, they can also present a variety of ethical challenges, from prevalence of racism and sexism, to troubled relationships, histories of abusive behavior, and aggression, mood swings and impulsive behavior associated with cognitive decline. I draw on Confucian ethics, especially the concept of filial piety, to address these issues. Confucian scholars have developed a rich set of theoretical (...) resources for dealing with beloved but imperfect elders, and navigating the challenges of supporting seniors whose ethical commitments are unreliable. These resources provide a way to reconcile two important but conflicting desiderata: to value and care for seniors, but also to clear-mindedly deal with their moral shortcomings. In particular, they articulate a duty to remonstrate with our elders when they err. Confucian filial piety can helpfully inform robot design and use in geriatric care. They can be used to strengthen and protect emotional connections in important relationships, but should not be used to reinforce patient preferences when doing so damages relationships or their ability to act morally. Rather than conceive of patient wellbeing as in tension with moral behavior, and care as a burden for caregivers, not a source of value and meaning, Confucian accounts of filial piety help identify both new areas of concern and new potential in the development of caregiving technologies, ones which see these goods as complementary. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article is that Kant’s concept of law is a non-positivistic one, notwithstanding the fact that his legal philosophy includes very strong positivistic elements. My argument takes as its point of departure the distinction of three elements, around which the debate between positivism and non-positivism turns: first, authoritative issuance, second, social efficacy, and, third, moral correctness. All positivistic theories are confined to the first two elements. As soon as a necessary connection between these first two elements (...) and the third element, moral correctness, is established, the picture changes fundamentally. Positivism becomes non-positivism. There exist two kinds of connections between law and morality: classifying and qualifying connections. This distinction stems from different sorts of effects that moral defects give rise to. A classifying connection leads to the loss of legal validity, whereas a qualifying connection leads only to legal defectiveness. In Kant’s theory of law both connections are found. The qualifying connection is conspicuous throughout Kant’s theory of law, whereas the classifying connection, by contrast, is rare and well hidden. This will suffice to consider Kant as a representative of inclusive non-positivism. (shrink)

This article defends a non-positivist theory of law, that is, a theory that accepts the necessary connection between legal validity and moral correctness by reference to the work of John Finnis. It begins with the dual nature of law as comprising both a real or factual dimension and an ideal dimension. Important examples show that at least some kinds of moral defect can deprive law of validity from the perspective of a participant in the legal system. The nature of the (...) connection between moral defectiveness and legal defectiveness is specified in terms of three possibilities: exclusive non-positivism, in which all cases of moral defect render law invalid; inclusive non-positivism, in which moral defect renders law invalid in some cases; and super-inclusive non-positivism, in which legal validity is not affected by moral defect at all. The paper argues for inclusive non-positivism as exemplified by the Radbruch Formula, according to which extreme injustice is not law, and which strikes the right balance between the ideal and real dimensions of law, against John Finnis’s account, which can be seen as an example of super-inclusive non-positivism, although his most recent work has tended towards the inclusive version. (shrink)

Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how (...) are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content. (shrink)

La grande difficulté du spinozisme est à rechercher dans le langage. Il y a au moins partout deux langages, l'un philosophique que l'on emploie rarement, et l'autre propre à la langue vulgaire. Nous pourrissons le spéculatif par le vulgaire et nous rendons impie la langue commune par l'intrusion du spéculatif. Comment gouverner le démon du langage? Ce qu'il faut en tout premier lieu discerner, c'est la qualité intime qui confère au langage la possibilité de tromper. Si l'on songe, de plus, (...) que le langage est le lien indéfectible de la communauté humaine, on verra son étude se relier aux synthèses principielles de la politique saisie à l'intérieur de l'encyclopédie spinoziste. À cela s'ajoute la liaison à l'erreur. Un blasphème n'est pas seulement une faute, c'est aussi une erreur, et la théorie de l'erreur est la refondation du système spinoziste capable de chasser l'erreur de partout, et donc de l'Éthique tout entière. Spinoza, pas plus que Fichte, n'acceptera la disjonction du faire (Tun) et du dire (Sagen) –?la morale est enracinée dans la linguistique, et naturellement la théorie de la vérité conforte ces alliances. La bonne lecture doit passer de la langue à la parole comme a priori signifiant, à Dieu comme réflexion absolue, et aussi bien de la conscience d'obstacle comme immédiateté à la conscience de soi. J'obtiens donc une synthèse quintuple. La. Conscience de soi (1) détermine la conscience d'objet (2) et le silence humain (3) est déterminé pas le silence divin (4). La conscience philosophique et son discours occupe le centre (5), et d'étage en étage, on s'élève à la science comme éducation. (shrink)

The author outlines his thesis that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse (Sonderfallthese) and develops it as an attempt to cover both the authoritative, institutional, or real and free, discursive, or ideal dimension of legal reasoning. On this basis, he examines the objections raised by Habermas (1996) to the special case thesis. First, he discusses the reduction of general practical discourse to moral discourses (genus proximum problem) holding that the former is a combination of moral, ethical, (...) and pragmatic arguments within the priority of just; second, he examines the objection that general practical arguments change their character or nature when employed in legal contexts (subset and specification problem) and the related problems concerning legal validity and unjust law. He concludes proposing a procedural (opposite to a coherential) integration of general practical arguments in the legal context. (shrink)

In medical ethics, a large body of work exists on the virtues that enable good medical practice. Medical virtue ethics singles out a number of virtues of the good doctor for attention; among others, these include empathy, care, truthfulness, and justice. According to medical ethicists like Pellegrino and Thomasma, however, phronesis, or “practical wisdom,” occupies a special place among these virtues. For Pellegrino and Thomasma, phronesis is “indispensable” to good medical practice, because it coordinates all the different moral virtues that (...) the doctor must bring to ethical decisions as part of wise moral action.... (shrink)

Robert Alexy defines law as including a claim to moral correctness and demonstrating social efficacy. This paper argues that law's social efficacy is not merely an observable fact but is undergirded by moral commitments by rulers that it is possible for their subjects to follow the rules, that the rulers and others will also follow the rules, that subjects will be protected from violence if they act in accordance with the rules, and that subjects will be entitled to legal redress (...) if others act violently towards them otherwise than in accordance with the rules. Alexy is correct in his conclusion that a system of norms that is not by and large socially efficacious is not a valid legal system, but wrong insofar as he follows legal positivism in distinguishing this aspect of law's validity from law's claim to moral correctness. (shrink)

According to the author there is no doubt that one has to distinguish between the justification and the application of norms. Problems are seen only to arise if one asks what exactly the distinction is and which consequences have to be drawn from it. Recently, Klaus Günther, in particular, has searched for this distinction and connected it with far‐reaching conclusions concerning the theory of norms, arguments, and morals. His theses are the object of the author's considerations.

This article offers the motivation for organising a conference on philosophy as it is practised across several faculties and departments at the University of Cambridge. It also offers an overview of the main themes that emerge in the essays collected in this issue of Metaphilosophy, which derive from the aforementioned conference. In particular it focuses on the risk of scholasticism and dogmatism that philosophy faces when it divorces itself from its own history, other disciplines, and real life. It then discusses (...) the potential problems that can arise from the practice of philosophy in close conjunction with other disciplines, such as the natural sciences and the history of philosophy. Finally, it briefly comments on how institutional/academic structures have an influence on the way philosophy is practised. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de présenter la première traduction française de deux textes de Helmholtz de 1878. À la lumière du développement des géométries non euclidiennes, il y critique la conception kantienne de l’espace. Par là même, il expose une redéfinition purement empiriste de la construction des déterminations spatiales qui, sous le nom de « géométrie physique », joua un rôle important chez Poincaré (qui la révise) et chez Einstein.

ResumenEl enfoque posracionalista surge desde la crítica constructivista a la forma en que el cognitivismo tradicional conceptualiza la relación entre sujeto y realidad. Tomando como principal unidad de análisis el estudio de la identidad personal como fenómeno bio-psicológico, el modelo de Vittorio Guidano se ha convertido en la formulación más popular de este enfoque. Lamentablemente, la abrupta partida de su fundador parece haber dejado una serie de cuestiones conceptuales abiertas a la base del modelo. El presente artículo identifica los aspectos (...) fundamentales de la epistemología posracionalista de Guidano y luego de explorar su obra tardía, propone que es posible identificar dos momentos fundamentales en el enfoque: (i) Un primer momento (que denominamos Guidano 1 y que concentra la mayoría de la literatura en el tema) que es la expresión de una marcada influencia constructivista que implica la idea de que el principio organizador del funcionamiento de los sistemas humanos es la sobrevivencia. (ii) Un segundo momento (que llamamos Guidano 2 y que no ha sido exhaustivamente explorado en la literatura actual) que puede ser identificado como el producto de un giro hacia la filosofía fenomenológico-existencial. Acá, la identidad de un organismo no solo está orientada a la sobrevivencia, sino que, sobre todo, al sentido de la existencia misma. Se concluye clarificando el tipo de fenomenología que guiaría la práctica clínica de Guidano 2.Palabras clave: cognitivismo; constructivismo; fenomenología; posracionalismo. (shrink)